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Note 
 
Combating Joint Ventures in Suppression: 
Taking Inventory of the Legal Arsenal  
Daniel J. Iden 
What happens to a technology suppressed? In the 1980s 
and 1990s, Sony and Philips collaborated as key players in the 
development of recordable and rewritable compact disc technol-
ogy.1 The companies, however, had each individually developed 
and patented a solution for encoding position information, 
enabling a CD reader/writer to maintain proper positioning 
while writing data to the disc.2 In order to promulgate a uni-
form set of recordable CD standards for the industry, the two 
companies agreed to promote Philips’s analog method, on the 
basis that it was more implementable than Sony’s digital en-
coding.3 Sony and Philips then authored a publication entitled 
―Recordable CD Standard,‖ informally referred to as the 
―Orange Book.‖4 The two jointly licensed the patents to manu-
facture Orange Book-compliant discs, yet still chose to include 
Sony’s unused digital patent.5 Additionally, the license offered 
to manufacturers included an agreement not to use Sony’s pa-
 
  J.D. 2012, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2008, Northwes-
tern University. The author thanks Thomas Cotter for his helpful advice and 
guidance; Will Stancil for his comments and methodical insight; and the staff 
and editors of the Minnesota Law Review for their tireless attention to detail. 
Above all, the author expresses gratitude to his family, friends, and Riley, who 
collectively have endured more casual conversation on patents than anyone 
undoubtedly should. Copyright © 2011 by Daniel J. Iden. 
 1. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2480 (2011). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.; see also Understanding CD-R & CD-RW: Physical, Logical and 
File System Standards, OPTICAL STORAGE TECH. ASS’N, http://www.osta.org/ 
technology/cdqa2.htm ( last visited Oct. 13, 2011) (providing more specific in-
formation on the standards contained in the Orange Book). 
 5. Sheri Qualters, Full Federal Circuit Narrowly Applies Patent Misuse 
Doctrine, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 
1202471475859. 
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tent to compete with Philips’s technology nor to use it as a basis 
for an alternative technology.6 Essentially, Sony and Philips, in 
the course of a joint venture, decided to promote one patent, 
while relegating the other to be an undeveloped and unexplored 
alternative.  
Technology suppression—purposefully withholding new 
and potentially useful inventions from society—is intuitively 
worrisome. Since an improvement or variation on another’s in-
vention still requires the original inventor’s permission to be 
used or sold,7 a patent on a pioneering technology likely 
represents control of all its derivatives.8 For this reason, per-
haps the law should fully encourage the development of these 
budding scientific avenues. The grant of a patent, however, 
comes with no affirmative obligation to use the technology; in-
stead, the patentee is merely given the temporary right to pre-
vent others from doing so.9 It seems difficult, then, to make 
productive use obligatory while still respecting this fundamen-
tal tenet of patent law. Moreover, it is largely unresolved 
whether a joint venture, like the one between Sony and Philips, 
would result in different approaches than those suggested by 
existing legal precedent. 
Part I of this Note explores the history of antitrust law as 
courts have applied it to patents, the development of the mis-
use doctrine, and an overview of patent damages and compul-
sory licenses. Part II addresses the strengths and shortcomings 
of applying each of these approaches. Finally, Part III encour-
ages the courts to embrace a reworking of patent remedies to 
limit joint ventures in technology suppression, as the best of 
several imperfect solutions. This Note proposes only awarding 
damages to suppressed patent holders—taking advantage of 
the information available in joint ventures—to best deter those 
that harm society by stifling innovation and impeding  
competition. 
 
 6. Id.; see also Princo, 616 F.3d at 1322–23 (outlining further details 
about  the package license agreement). 
 7. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT 
LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 49 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining the 
phenomenon of ―blocking patents‖). 
 8. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (noting that a 
patent ―may confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development‖). 
 9. See 35 U.S.C § 154(a) (2006). 
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I.  DEVELOPMENT AND DOCTRINE: AVAILABLE LEGAL 
AVENUES   
Several legal theories may be available to prevent joint 
ventures from suppressing technology. Section 1 of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act forbids any contract in restraint of trade.10 
This section may apply, though it would be subject to the flexi-
ble ―Rule of Reason,‖11 relying on courts to decide whether the 
arrangement is more harmful to competition than helpful.12 
Another avenue, the doctrine of patent misuse, allows an oth-
erwise-infringer to invoke an affirmative defense: that the 
holder has wrongly used a patent beyond its appropriate 
scope.13 Alternatively, commentators have proposed an applica-
tion of compulsory licensing for patents,14 where a court would 
refuse to grant an injunction prohibiting the infringer’s use or 
sale, but would instead force the patentee to accept some sort of 
reasonable compensation arrangement from the infringer.15 
A. PATENTS AND ANTITRUST: AN UNEASY BALANCE 
There is an inherent tension between patent rights and an-
titrust law.16 Patent law derives from a constitutional authori-
zation to grant inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries 
for a limited time.17 This right compensates inventors for con-
tributing to the public good, namely, in disclosing new and use-
ful inventions.18 The Sherman Act, on the other hand, was de-
signed to counteract monopolistic activities that became a 
 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 11. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 
(2010). 
 12. See infra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 13. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2480 (2011) (quoting B. Braun Med., 
Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 14. E.g., Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest 
as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 397 
(2002). 
 15. Id. at 434. 
 16. Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades of Meaning, 13 
VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, ¶ 1 (2008), http://www.vjolt.net/vol13/issue3/v13i3_a5-Feldman 
.pdf [hereinafter Feldman, Patent and Antitrust]. 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 18. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (―The basic quid pro quo 
contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent mo-
nopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial 
utility.‖). 
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concern in the late 19th century.19 In the absence of reasonable 
substitutes for a certain commodity, the holder of a monopoly—
whether under a lawful patent grant or otherwise—is able to 
charge a higher price than would otherwise be feasible.20 It is 
not hard to predict conflict between a system providing inven-
tors with lawful monopolies and laws forbidding monopoliza-
tion. 
The Sherman Act’s first two sections outline unacceptable 
anticompetitive behavior. The Act prohibits any monopoliza-
tion—or attempt at monopolization—over any part of trade.21 
Also forbidden is a contract, conspiracy, or combination to mo-
nopolize or otherwise restrain trade.22 Notably, the two viola-
tions each require a different level of proof: a conspiracy to re-
strain trade would likely be easier for a plaintiff to prove than a 
monopolization over trade.23  
Courts often apply the rule of reason to determine whether 
anticompetitive behavior rises to the level of an antitrust viola-
tion.24 The rule of reason asks whether the actions at issue un-
duly restrict or obstruct trade.25 A showing of procompetitive 
interests can usually overcome allegations of a violation.26 To 
streamline the inquiry, courts have determined that some anti-
competitive activity gives rise to a presumption of a Sherman 
 
 19. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492–93 (1940) (com-
menting on public concerns that ultimately served as a backdrop for the 
Sherman Act). 
 20. See Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Pa-
tent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 436–37 (2003) [hereinafter Feldman, Insuf-
ficiency] (noting that in antitrust inquiries ―a firm must have market power in 
order to create anticompetitive effects‖ while a patentee ―theoretically has 
power over the market represented by those . . . interested‖). 
 21. 15 U.S.C § 2 (2006). 
 22. Id. § 1; see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 788 
(1946) (―[Sections] 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act require proof of conspiracies 
which are reciprocally distinguishable from and independent of each other al-
though the objects of the conspiracies may partially overlap.‖). 
 23. See Am. Tobacco Co., 328 U.S. at 788 (noting ―a conspiracy in restraint 
of trade . . . may stop short of monopoly‖ but suggesting ―a conspiracy to mo-
nopolize‖ may not be satisfied by a ―restraint short of monopoly‖). 
 24. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911). 
 25. See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911) (reite-
rating the rule of reason articulated in Standard Oil Co. v. United States as 
determining whether an act unduly restrained trade). 
 26. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 240 (1918) (ob-
serving approvingly that a policy at the Chicago Board of Trade ―helped to im-
prove market conditions‖). 
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Act violation.27 Examples of such conduct include price fixing, 
division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements.28 
Of particular relevance to patents is the notion of tying—that 
is, the conditioning of the sale of one product on the purchase of 
another (usually undesired) item.29  
Patent holders may also create anticompetitive effects by 
offering licenses only to selected collections of patents. Compa-
nies sometimes offer joint licenses for a certain group of pa-
tents, referred to as a patent pool or package license.30 Aggre-
gating intellectual property rights in this way has benefits, the 
most significant likely being the reduction in transaction 
costs.31 A cross-licensing agreement among firms may also 
promote collaboration, enabling technologies that may not oth-
erwise be available.32 Patent pools, however, also enable collu-
sion between firms and may foreclose competition, especially 
when the pool’s use becomes foundational and widespread—
such as when it becomes an industry standard.33  
In light of these dangers, the Department of Justice’s Anti-
trust Division considered the idea of declaring patent pools il-
 
 27. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (―[T]here are 
certain agreements or practices which . . . are conclusively presumed to be un-
reasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry . . . .‖). 
 28. Id. But see Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31–37 
(2006) (rejecting tying of patented products as a per se antitrust violation un-
less market power is shown). 
 29. See Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 31 (providing a definition of ―tying‖); 
Sarita Frattaroli, Note, Dodging the Bullet Again: Microsoft III’s Reformula-
tion of the Foremost Technological Tying Doctrine, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1909, 1910 
(2010) (―Tying occurs when a seller requires a consumer to purchase a second 
good in order to purchase the first good.‖). The Clayton Antitrust Act statutori-
ly prohibits these arrangements, though courts have viewed the requirements 
under this provision and the Sherman Act to be substantially the same. 15 
U.S.C. § 14 (2006); see Thomas F. Cotter, Four Questionable Rationales for the 
Patent Misuse Doctrine 3 n.17 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Re-
search Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-30, 2010), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=161275 (noting the minority and majority views about substan-
tive requirements for tying to be an antitrust violation). 
 30. David W. Van Etten, Note, Everyone in the Patent Pool: U.S. Philips 
Corp. v. International Trade Commission, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 241, 242 
(2007). 
 31. See id. (―Package licenses promise transactional efficiency: it is easier, 
quicker, and cheaper to conduct transactions with one pool containing mul-
tiple patents than it is to transact individual patents separately.‖). 
 32. See Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment of Cur-
rent Law and Policy, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 540 (2006). 
 33. Id. at 542. 
 2011] JOINT VENTURES IN SUPPRESSION 283 
 
legal during the 1970s,34 but, eventually, the Department re-
versed course and instead touted the procompetitive benefits of 
these arrangements.35 Acknowledging that patent pooling can 
have benefits for competition,36 the Department of Justice gave 
its blessing to a specific proposed package licensing arrange-
ment, on the condition that the patent pool contained no pa-
tents that would otherwise compete against each other.37 More-
over, an independent expert would verify that the patent pool 
contained no substitutable technologies—in other words, that 
all the patents included were ―essential.‖38 This verification sat-
isfied the Antitrust Division, and it suggested that if these 
standards were met it would not prosecute the patent holder 
for antitrust violations.39 Presumably, any patent pool that 
meets these requirements would likewise be safe from govern-
ment prosecution, though private action would remain a  
possibility. 
Antitrust law, as it currently stands, would at best only be 
moderately effective against technology suppression. With a 
private plaintiff ’s rule of reason-weighted burden and a gov-
ernmental reluctance to prosecute, the law would have to coun-
terbalance these to be an effective method of preventing tech-
nology suppression. There are other possible avenues of 
combating suppression, however, which are exclusive to patent 
law. 
B.  THE NEBULOUS DOCTRINE OF PATENT MISUSE 
Another avenue available to deter joint ventures from en-
gaging in technology suppression is the patent misuse doctrine. 
Misuse, when employed as a term of art, is a defense to a pa-
tent infringement claim—stemming from the equitable doctrine 
 
 34. Roger B. Andewelt, Analysis of Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 611, 620 (1984). 
 35. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, 
Antitrust Div., to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell (Dec. 16, 
1998), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf. 
 36. See id. (referring to patent pooling as having ―competitive benefits‖). 
 37. Id.; see also Van Etten, supra note 30, at 246 (discussing the proposed 
plan and the DOJ’s acceptance). 
 38. Van Etten, supra note 30, at 246; Letter from Joel I. Klein to Garrard 
R. Beeney, supra note 35. 
 39. See Letter from Joel I. Klein to Garrard R. Beeney, supra note 35 
(―For these reasons, the Department is not presently inclined to initiate anti-
trust enforcement action against the conduct you have described.‖). 
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of unclean hands40—available against a patentee who used her 
patent in a way that is outside the scope of her granted rights, 
with anticompetitive effect.41 While patent misuse will neces-
sarily overlap with the realm of antitrust law, courts have reit-
erated that the fields are not precisely identical.42 The ambigui-
ty surrounding the justifications and boundaries of the largely 
court-made43 misuse doctrine has invited vigorous debate over 
the role it should play.44 Patent misuse, shaped in large part by 
courts, has some singular nuances owing to its equitable roots. 
Recently, however, Congress has weighed in on the role the 
doctrine should play in modern jurisprudence. 
1. A Court-Created Doctrine 
The early developments of patent misuse followed the con-
tours of another doctrine: patent exhaustion. The patent ex-
haustion doctrine reflects the idea that a patentee is adequate-
ly compensated by the first sale of a patented product; the 
owner may not continue to assert control over subsequent pur-
chasers of the product.45 In Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Uni-
versal Film Manufacturing Co., the patent misuse doctrine’s 
earliest roots, the Supreme Court held invalid an arrangement 
in which the seller of a patented movie projector affixed a no-
tice to its product, requiring the consumer and all future users 
to use only the seller’s movies.46 In rejecting this restraint, the 
Court noted that any additional control over a product ―cannot 
be derived from or protected by the patent law, which allows a 
grant only of the right to an exclusive use of the new and useful 
discovery . . . and nothing more.‖47 It also disapprovingly char-
acterized the patentee’s attempts to ―continue the pa-
 
 40. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 41. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2480 (2011) (citing Windsurfing Int’l, 
Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 42. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc., 157 F.3d at 1372 (―Patent misuse is viewed 
as a broader wrong than antitrust violation . . . . Thus misuse may arise when 
the conditions of antitrust violation are not met.‖). 
 43. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1329. 
 44. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 903 (2007) 
(proposing a limited application); Feldman, Insufficiency, supra note 20, at 402 
(criticizing the Federal Circuit’s current formulation); Mark A. Lemley, Com-
ment, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1599, 1600 (1990) (declaring misuse redundant). 
 45. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[2][a] (2011). 
 46. 243 U.S. 502, 506–07 (1917). 
 47. Id. at 513. 
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tent . . . after it has expired‖ and ―create a monopoly . . . wholly 
outside of the patent.‖48 The Court’s analysis addressing im-
permissibly expanding a patent’s scope solidified the frame-
work for the development of the misuse doctrine.49 
2. Peculiarities of Misuse 
Patent misuse possesses several characteristics that dis-
tinguish it from antitrust and standard patent litigation. First, 
a finding of patent misuse results only in the unenforceability 
of the patent for as long as the patent holder’s wrongdoing 
persists.50 Courts have specifically rejected the contention that 
damages, instead of unenforceability, may be available to an 
aggrieved party.51 In private enforcement of antitrust law, on 
the other hand, a successful plaintiff can recover treble damag-
es.52 The remedy for patent misuse also departs from general 
patent law, where successful defenses result in invalidation,53 
permanent unenforceability,54 or simply the escaping of liabili-
ty.55 Because courts have little discretion in determining the 
magnitude of an appropriate remedy, patent misuse is some-
what less flexible in creating disincentives for suppression. 
The patent misuse doctrine also has a relaxed standing re-
quirement, again distinguishing it from antitrust law.56 A de-
fendant need not show that she was specifically injured by the 
misuse,57 making it theoretically available to more patent de-
fendants than antitrust would be to otherwise-plaintiffs.58 Ad-
 
 48. Id. at 518. 
 49. See Cotter, supra note 44, at 907 (noting the origin of the patent mis-
use doctrine in case law). 
 50. CHISUM, supra note 45, § 19.04. 
 51. E.g., B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997). 
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 15a (2006). 
 53. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 
U.S. 722, 736 (2002) (noting that failure to meet patent requirements results 
in invalidity). 
 54. E.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 
867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 55. See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 
(2008) (reiterating ―initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all 
patent rights,‖ meaning an infringer cannot be liable in damages). See general-
ly CHISUM, supra note 45, § 19.01. 
 56. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942) 
(holding that the plaintiff ’s conduct is disqualifying, ―regardless of whether 
the particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent‖). 
 57. See id. 
 58. Cotter, supra note 44, at 902. 
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ditionally, some behaviors are considered per se indicators of 
patent misuse, while the antitrust route would require a more 
thorough proof of anticompetitive harm.59 Commentators have 
noted—sometimes pejoratively—that patent misuse in some 
cases can be antitrust ―on the cheap,‖60 since it costs less to 
raise the misuse defense once already sued for antitrust than to 
initiate a separate antitrust trial. Regardless of the merits of 
these features, they are distinct elements of patent misuse, and 
can offer both distinct advantages and drawbacks when apply-
ing the doctrine to technology suppression. 
3. Congressional Reform 
Five years after the patent misuse doctrine received nota-
ble criticism from Judge Richard Posner,61 the Senate drafted a 
bill that would have codified his view.62 The Senate bill, follow-
ing the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, would have brought 
the proof required under a patent misuse defense into harmony 
with established antitrust standards.63 Following some argu-
ments that the Senate bill would be too rigid and broad,64 the 
eventual 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act65 instead focused on 
two types of agreements that Congress felt should not be sub-
ject to a strict per se presumption of illegality.66  
First, the statute severely limits a court from finding mi-
suse in the tying of one patented product to another.67 A court, 
when investigating such an arrangement, must do so in ―view 
 
 59. See id. at 923 (suggesting that the agreement at issue in Brulotte v. 
Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), would have been more difficult to prove under an 
antitrust theory). This is not to say antitrust does not have its own per se 
rules, but rather, that they are not coextensive. 
 60. Patent Hawk (Gary Odom), THE PATENT PROSPECTOR (Aug. 30, 2010, 
5:20 PM), http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2010/08/misuse.html. 
 61. See USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510–12 (7th Cir. 
1982). 
 62. S. 438, 100th Cong. (1988). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Mi-
suse Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust 
Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 175, 196–201 (1989) (reviewing the perti-
nent legislative history). 
 65. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676. 
 66. See Calkins, supra note 64, at 197. 
 67. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2006). 
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of the circumstances,‖68 a fact-specific inquiry that has the 
trappings of a rule of reason test imported from antitrust law.69  
Second, the act declares that it is not patent misuse to 
simply ―refuse[] to license or use any rights to the patent.‖70 
Notably, however, the statutory phrasing appears only to pro-
tect single entities, not joint ventures.71 Regardless of their ex-
act extent, however, the congressional reforms embodied in the 
1988 Act undoubtedly prevented any further grand expansion 
of misuse and sent a firm legislative message.72 
C. REFORMING PATENT REMEDIES: MOVING PAST INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF 
Another method of attack against joint ventures in tech-
nology suppression could be a rethinking of patent remedies, 
since this can alter the incentives that lead to their formation 
in the first place. Patent remedies are specifically outlined in 
the Patent Act.73 A court has wide discretion in determining 
damages, and may award lost profits, reasonable royalties, or 
some other measure of economic injury.74 Even after a jury de-
cides on what constitutes just compensation to an aggrieved 
party, a court has the freedom to amplify damages as much as 
threefold.75 In addition to remedies traditionally available at 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Cotter, supra note 29 (noting how one court has read in a rule of 
reason test, even though the Federal Circuit has not opined on the matter); see 
also In re Recombinant DNA Tech. Patent and Contract Litig., 850 F. Supp. 
769, 777 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (inferring a rule of reason approach from legislative 
history). 
 70. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4). 
 71. See id. § 271(d) (―No patent owner . . . shall be denied relief . . . .‖ (em-
phasis added)). 
 72. See Calkins, supra note 64, at 228 (speculating about the ramifica-
tions of the 1988 Act); see also Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 
1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2480 (2011) 
(―Congress enacted section 271(d) not to broaden the doctrine of patent mis-
use, but to cabin it.‖). 
 73. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 284 (2006). 
 74. Id.; see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent 
Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 7 (2001) (noting how no version of the 
Patent Act has offered specific guidance in the calculation of damages, leaving 
courts to develop their own metrics). 
 75. 35 U.S.C. § 284. This increase, however, most commonly follows a 
finding of either willful infringement or bad faith litigation. CHISUM, supra 
note 45, § 20.03[4][b]; see also Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996) (―Because increased damages are punitive, the requisite conduct for 
imposing them must include some degree of culpability.‖). 
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law, the Patent Act also provides for equitable relief in the form 
of injunctions.76 
1. Patent Damages: The Traditional Standard 
Patent damages may better allow courts to craft appropri-
ate remedies for infringement under widely varying circums-
tances, including when a defendant is infringing a suppressed 
patent. For example, a court may award lost profits assuming a 
patentee establishes causation between the infringing action 
and a reduction in profitability.77 These can be a direct loss of 
sales, decreased profits from the infringer’s adding to the mar-
ket’s supply, or other injury.78 Moreover, a court can look to 
noninfringing transactions to guide it.79 For example, if an in-
fringed product is one which the patentee regularly licenses at 
an established price, a court can simply substitute this value as 
an estimate of lost profits from an infringing use.80 
Alternatively, if lost profits are too difficult or vague to be 
calculated accurately, the Patent Act permits a court to award 
reasonable royalties.81 Courts often try to simulate what would 
have happened at a hypothetical negotiation between the plain-
tiff and the defendant at the time of infringement.82 In deter-
mining the appropriate amount for a reasonable royalty, the 
trier of fact considers many factors.83  
 
 76. 35 U.S.C. § 283. 
 77. CHISUM, supra note 45, § 20.05. 
 78. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 74, at 10–11 (providing a list of injuries 
courts have found acceptable to award lost profits). 
 79. See id. at 7. 
 80. See id. at 7–8 (noting that the law permits this substitution if several 
factors are met). 
 81. 35 U.S.C. § 284; see also CHISUM, supra note 45, § 20.03[3] (―The 
courts developed the reasonable royalty measure as a means of providing a 
just recovery to a patent owner who could not, for evidentiary or other reasons, 
prove lost profits or an established royalty.‖). 
 82. CHISUM, supra note 45, § 20.03[3][a].  
 83. Id. § 20.03[3][b]. These factors were compiled in a federal district 
court case, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 
1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub nom., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. 
Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d. Cir. 1971), which has re-
ceived favorable treatment by the Federal Circuit, see Lucent Technologies v. 
Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (―[T]he flexible analysis of 
all applicable Georgia-Pacific factors provides a useful and legally-required 
framework . . . .‖). 
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2. Injunctive Relief Before and After eBay v. MercExchange 
Preliminary injunctions are available to patent holders, 
but the analysis is virtually the same as it would be under any 
other legal theory.84 A more robust body of case law exists with 
regard to permanent injunctions—which the Federal Circuit 
has emphasized is usually the appropriate remedy.85 
Although it appears that injunctions were almost automat-
ically granted after a finding of patent infringement,86 an in-
junction would be inappropriate in some circumstances such as 
when a patent term has already expired.87 Since the denial or 
grant of a permanent injunction requires the consideration of 
all the facts of a case, reviewed under a deferential standard,88 
much of the guiding case law has developed in the district 
courts.  
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C.,89 however, the Su-
preme Court clarified that there is some analysis required in 
determining when an injunction is appropriate.90 Disapproving 
of the Federal Circuit’s approach—basically, that patent law 
somehow confers a presumptive right to an injunction91—the 
Supreme Court in eBay reiterated that courts must proceed 
with the traditional four-factor test:92 
(1) that [the patent holder] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate 
to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by 
a permanent injunction.93 
 
 84. CHISUM, supra note 45, § 20.04[1]; see also High Tech Med. Instru-
mentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., 49 F.3d 1551, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(―This court has made clear that the standards applied to the grant of prelimi-
nary injunctions are the same in patent cases as in other areas of the law.‖). 
 85. E.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 
1989). 
 86. See id. 
 87. E.g., Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541, 1549–51 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
 88. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 
1986). 
 89. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 90. See CHISUM, supra note 45, § 20.04[2][b] (―[T]he Supreme Court ad-
dressed the proper standard for granting a permanent injunction . . . .‖). 
 91. See Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing Pa-
tentees After eBay v. MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 31–32 (2009). 
 92. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–93 (2006). 
 93. Id. at 391. 
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Of note is Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, appended to the 
rather brief per curiam opinion, which advocates against in-
junctions granted for nonpracticing patentees.94 Such patent 
holders—colloquially and pejoratively known as ―patent 
trolls‖95—attempt to use the relative certainty of an injunction 
to charge exceedingly high prices for a license.96 Since an in-
junction prohibiting the use of a company’s key product might 
completely destroy a business, these ―trolls‖ might use the 
threat of a near-automatic injunction to unfairly leverage pre-
suit or settlement negotiations.97 Kennedy argues that in these 
cases, legal damages would adequately compensate the ag-
grieved patentee.98 Interestingly enough, courts have adopted 
an approach supported by Kennedy’s concurrence, denying 
nonpracticing patentees injunctive relief and instead awarding 
―ongoing royalties.‖99  
In a 2002 article that predated the eBay decision, Kurt 
Saunders argued for a consideration of public interest when 
courts are determining whether or not to apply a compulsory 
licensing regime.100 One of the categories Saunders targeted as 
injurious to the public good is nonpracticing patentees who are 
unwilling to license their intellectual property rights.101 Post-
eBay, this particular consideration seems to have found some 
traction among courts, at least in effect.102 Saunders did not 
advocate for a comprehensive adoption of compulsory licens-
ing103 but observed that several statistical studies do not sup-
port the contention that a system would frustrate incentives for 
invention and disclosure.104 Modifying the remedies available 
to patent holders is one way to alter the environment that en-
 
 94. Id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 95. See generally John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007) (illustrating the use of the term). 
 96. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Venkatesan, supra note 91, at 39–40. These are interchangeably 
referred to as ―compulsory licenses.‖ Id. at 39. But see Paice LLC v. Toyota Mo-
tor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining the Federal 
Circuit’s rationale for distinguishing the two and preference for using ―ongoing 
royalty‖). 
 100. Saunders, supra note 14, at 451. 
 101. Id. at 441. 
 102. See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Saunders, supra note 14, at 451. 
 104. Id. at 439–41. A goal of the patent system is to encourage invention 
and disclosure. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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courages these technology-suppressing joint ventures to exist in 
the first place.  
These three broad areas of the law—antitrust law, patent 
misuse, and patent damages—each offer separate advantages 
and vulnerabilities to deter joint ventures from suppressing 
technologies. This Note examines the problem of joint ventures 
that suppress technology by attempting to merge it into exist-
ing doctrine. Because none of the existing avenues is an obvious 
and clear fit, the inquiry is about which round hole can best ac-
commodate joint suppression’s square peg. 
II.  WEIGHING THE ALTERNATIVES   
In countering the social costs of technology suppression, 
there are several legal avenues available. Applying a tradition-
al and familiar antitrust analysis has the advantage of robust 
case law and established doctrine, but the litigation is expen-
sive, the burden of showing market power is difficult, and anti-
trust goals may be fundamentally misaligned with those of in-
tellectual property.105 Alternatively, the patent misuse doctrine 
may have an advantage in its ability to deter anticompetitive 
behavior outside the bounds of the Sherman Act, but its poten-
tial for abuse by litigants and its lax standing requirement may 
render it undesirable. Finally, compulsory licenses may find a 
middle ground between a patentee’s intellectual property rights 
and the public’s interest in technological development, but an 
inherent conflict with patent law’s bundle of rights and the dif-
ficulty of managing conflicting incentives make workability un-
clear. 
A. ANTITRUST: THE STATUS QUO IS NOT QUITE GOOD ENOUGH 
Relying on an antitrust framework to deter technology 
suppression offers some advantages, like its venerable history 
and comprehensive court-made doctrine. It also presents some 
formidable challenges, including tough standing requirements 
and a potential to overemphasize only part of the effects stem-
ming from those joint agreements. 
 
 105. It is necessary to clarify that when this Note proposes antitrust law as 
a solution, it means to present antitrust as being the exclusive solution. The 
other avenues are presented as alternatives supplementing existing antitrust 
enforcement, and presumably providing better deterrence. 
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1.  Antitrust Law Is a Well-Developed Doctrine Applied 
Frequently by Courts 
The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890,106 has enjoyed a long 
history of scholarly analysis and regular use by litigants.107 
One consequence of this history has been the development of a 
robust court-created jurisprudence.108 For example, courts have 
been applying the rule of reason for nearly one hundred 
years.109 
While the Act’s longevity alone does not necessarily sug-
gest a better solution for solving the issue of technology sup-
pression,110 the sheer length and frequency of considering the 
issue points toward a more refined test.111 Indeed, commenta-
tors have noted the relative ―coheren[ce]‖ of antitrust law.112 
The Supreme Court has also declared certain behavior per se 
anticompetitive, often making judicial determinations easier.113 
Detracting from the efficiency of these declarations, however, is 
the fact that they are often slow to materialize.114 While courts 
 
 106. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)). 
 107. See, e.g., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, U.S. District Courts—Civil 
Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken, During the 12-Month 
Period Ending March 31, 2010, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/ ( last visited 
Oct. 14, 2010) (click on ―Statistics,‖; then click on ―Caseload Statistics 2010,‖; 
then click on ―Table C-4‖) (showing that in 2010, for example, 1078 cases were 
initiated in federal courts under antitrust laws). 
 108. See, e.g., Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-
CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.42 (1981) (―In antitrust, the federal courts enjoy more 
flexibility and act more as common-law courts than in other areas governed by 
federal statute.‖); see also Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 87–89 (2010) (explaining the ambiguity in the statute 
and the necessity for the courts to provide an analytical framework). 
 109. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 110. See DEANNA D. SELLNOW, CONFIDENT PUBLIC SPEAKING 394 (2d ed. 
2005) (explaining the ―appeal to tradition‖ logical fallacy, i.e., the mistaken 
belief that some method is superior just because it has been in practice for a 
long time). 
 111. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 
900–02 (2007) (noting that the Court has ―continued to temper, limit, or over-
rule‖ aspects of the doctrine). 
 112. Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 
476 (2011). 
 113. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Feldman, Insufficiency, supra note 20, at 419 (observing that 
courts generally use per se analysis only after observing that the behavior in 
question is nearly always anticompetitive). 
 2011] JOINT VENTURES IN SUPPRESSION 293 
 
have experience with joint ventures115 and unilateral technolo-
gy suppression,116 an antitrust scrutiny of the combination of 
the two might require lengthy judicial examination. 
Moreover, patent misuse doctrine has been in develop-
ment—though, granted, in flux—since the early part of the 
twentieth century,117 and relying on antitrust for its history 
alone does not confer an appreciable comparative advantage. 
Though the courts’ history with antitrust provides an estab-
lished framework,118 it is unlikely that familiarity with inter-
preting the Sherman Act is, by itself, a persuasive reason to  
foreclose alternative approaches to preventing joint ventures 
from suppressing technologies. 
2.  Antitrust Claims Have Important Limits on Litigants’ 
Ability To Sue 
Optimally, to deter technology suppression by joint ven-
tures, those injured should have the ability to bring suit. In an-
titrust law, a private plaintiff must overcome several difficult 
hurdles in proving her case. The plaintiff must show both indi-
vidual harm (standing) and anticompetitive effects to prevail.119 
In the case of tying, though spared a full inquiry of anticompe-
titive effects under the rule of reason,120 a successful plaintiff 
must instead show that the defendant possesses market power 
in the relevant field.121  
 
 115. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1911) 
(describing an agreement between more than seventy business entities). 
 116. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204–09 (2d Cir. 
1981) (discussing Xerox’s unilateral refusal to use or license many of its pa-
tents); see also Gerald Sobel, The Antitrust Interface with Patents and Innova-
tion: Acquisition of Patents and Grant-Backs, Non-Use, Fraud on the Patent 
Office, Development of New Products and Joint Research, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 
681, 683–89 (1984) (providing background for the SCM Corp. case). 
 117. See Bohannan, supra note 112, at 479 (tracing back to the ―seminal‖ 
patent misuse case in 1917); see also supra notes 46–49 and accompanying 
text (discussing that case). 
 118. See Bohannan, supra note 112, at 477 (arguing that ―antitrust law 
provides courts with a well-developed set of rules by which to judge the com-
plexities of effects on competition‖). 
 119. See Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885, 
892 (D. Mass. 1980), aff ’d, 649 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1981) (explaining that 
―[p]atent misuse requires a lesser showing than a Sherman Act violation,‖ be-
cause proving individual harm and anticompetitive effects are not necessary). 
 120. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 121. Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006) (―[ I]n all cases in-
volving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has 
market power in the tying product.‖). 
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These showings become even more difficult for a plaintiff 
suing a joint venture that is suppressing a technology.122 For 
example, in terms of standing, the party—a licensee, current or 
potential competitor, or even a member of the public—likely 
will have a difficult time demonstrating individual harm.123 
The alleged damages often will simply be too speculative to 
prove an actionable injury.124 Perhaps this high bar to entry is 
good, as it likely would prevent frivolous litigation. Since anti-
trust trials are infamously expensive,125 the threats of these 
high costs could enable plaintiffs with attenuated connections 
to coerce large settlements.126 The problem is, the individual 
―injuries‖ that joint ventures in technology suppression tend to 
cause are, indeed, more speculative and difficult to quantify: 
the elimination of a firm’s chance to develop a technology into a 
viable commercial alternative or the public’s chance to enjoy it. 
Frustratingly, the advantages of antitrust litigation—keeping 
out meritless claims—also serve to bar those plaintiffs that 
would be aggrieved by a harmful joint venture suppressing 
technology. 
3.  Antitrust May Overemphasize Procompetitive Effects 
Antitrust law developed to maintain controls on the free 
market.127 One could state the goal of antitrust jurisprudence 
succinctly as ―competition.‖128 Likewise, intellectual property’s 
oversimplified catchphrase would be ―innovation.‖129 Neverthe-
less, the juxtaposition of those aims illustrates a key problem 
 
 122. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (―The antitrust laws . . . provide no adequate reme-
dy for the suppression of competition.‖), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2480 (2011).  
 123. See Bohannan, supra note 112, at 514 (noting a potential rival produc-
er’s difficulty in showing a technology ―would have come to fruition and would 
have become commercially successful but for the IP holder’s restraint‖). 
 124. See id. 
 125. Paul J. Stancil, Atomism and the Private Merger Challenge, 78 TEMP. 
L. REV. 949, 996–97 (2005). Stancil also discusses the overwhelming risks as-
sociated with antitrust litigation. Id. 
 126. Cf. Golden, supra note 95, at 2128–29 (making a similar argument for 
the high costs of patent infringement defense). 
 127. EARL W. KINTNER ET AL., 1 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 1.16 (2010); see 
also Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 108, at 75 (explaining how antitrust law has 
been driven by evolving perceptions of economics). 
 128. See Bohannan, supra note 112, at 500 (referring to ―antitrust’s com-
petitive ideal‖). 
 129. See id. at 499 (describing intellectual property law’s role as ―the en-
gine of innovation‖). 
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with cabining suppressive joint ventures within antitrust law: 
its harm may lie largely outside of competitive concerns.130 
Because an analysis under § 1 of the Sherman Act would 
be subject to a rule of reason inquiry, a court would look for 
procompetitive effects to determine if the agreement is legal.131 
Arrangements to suppress do often provide legitimate benefits 
to the relevant market. For example, package licensing might 
help to simplify the search of a potential licensee.132 If a party 
needs ten different patents to make a certain product, a pack-
age license permits ―one stop shopping,‖ contributing to a more 
efficient market.133 Since these effects invariably fall under a 
rule of reason analysis, while the stifling of future innovation 
may not,134 antitrust analysis would likely overemphasize the 
former over the latter.135 Antitrust addresses some, but not all, 
the concerns that joint ventures in technology suppression in-
troduce. 
B.  PATENT MISUSE: THE CLUMSY ALTERNATIVE 
Patent misuse is a frequently overlooked doctrine that 
could be a powerful tool in combating suppression, particularly 
because of its lax standing requirement. It is not clear, howev-
er, to what extent the doctrine can survive a substantial rein-
terpretation and a new application—being invoked to deter 
joint ventures that suppress technology. 
1.  Misuse Is A Doctrine Embattled 
Academically, judicially, and legislatively, the doctrine of 
patent misuse is losing favor. Critics question whether there is 
any persuasive justification for its existence.136 Alternatively, it 
 
 130. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (noting that an effect of suppression was that it 
―preclud[ed] licensees from developing alternatives‖), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 
2480 (2011). 
 131. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 132. Van Etten, supra note 30, at 243; see supra notes 30–32 and accompa-
nying text. 
 133. See Van Etten, supra note 30, at 243 (explaining the necessity to con-
tract with too many parties creates inefficiencies). 
 134. See Bohannan, supra note 112 (―[C]ase law has embraced an antitrust 
standard for misuse, which may be coherent, but is less faithful to the core IP 
values of promoting innovation and protecting access to the public domain.‖). 
 135. See id. at 479 (noting an antitrust approach would place ―too much 
attention on market power in the patented . . . technology and too little on the 
foreclosure of rival products or technologies‖). 
 136. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 29, at 21 (―The analysis presented above 
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is put forward as a workable tool, but not before being substan-
tially reformulated.137 Meanwhile, in the courts, the doctrine 
persists in sort of a fragmented double existence: the Federal 
Circuit generally scrutinizing under an antitrust-inspired 
standard,138 while both that court and the Supreme Court rei-
terate that at least some of patent misuse lies beyond the reach 
of antitrust.139 The Federal Circuit en banc majority in a recent 
case, however, seems to favor the demise of patent misuse, la-
menting that the Supreme Court’s precedents on the doctrine 
have not been overruled.140 Moreover, Congress has moved to-
ward restricting misuse,141 suggesting perhaps a loss of confi-
dence in its utility and hinting toward its ultimate elimination. 
With courts and scholars alike struggling to justify patent 
misuse’s modern role, it seems a stretch to reconstruct it for use 
as a tool in combating joint ventures involving suppressed 
technology. Such an application would require at least a signif-
icant reconstruction of the doctrine by the court. Moreover, 
while a joint venture that refuses to license or use its patent 
might not be protected from a finding of misuse,142 to interpret 
§ 271(d) in this way seems, in a sense, disingenuous to the sta-
tute’s purpose and spirit.143 Even notwithstanding these objec-
tions, there is ambiguity whether the suppressed patent holder 
 
calls into question the need for any patent misuse doctrine . . . .‖ (emphasis in 
original)).  
 137. See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 112, at 478 (―[M]isuse has been shoot-
ing at the wrong targets.‖). 
 138. See Cotter, supra note 29, at 4–5 (commenting that the Federal Cir-
cuit uses a rule of reason test from antitrust when faced with behavior that is 
neither legal nor illegal per se). 
 139. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 
(1969) (―[ I]t does not necessarily follow that the misuse embodies the ingre-
dients of a violation of . . . the Sherman Act . . . .‖); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 
Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (―Patent misuse is viewed as a 
broader wrong than antitrust violation . . . .‖). 
 140. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2480 (2011). 
 141. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006) (providing limits on misuse). 
 142. See id. (referring repeatedly to ―the patent owner‖). A joint venture 
may not be safe under this provision because the nub of the harm is not simply 
the refusal to license or use, as implicated under subdivision 5, but rather to 
enter into an agreement to suppress a technology, regardless of market power. 
See id. 
 143. Cf. Richard Calkins, supra note 64, at 228 (1989) (claiming that the 
1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act was one small step toward the goal of a more 
laissez-faire market). Presumably, Congress wanted to limit the application of 
misuse. See id. at 177 (―Congress started to restrict the rights of infringers to 
assert misuse defenses . . . .‖). 
 2011] JOINT VENTURES IN SUPPRESSION 297 
 
or the promoted patent holder (or both) is guilty of misuse. This 
lack of clarity is perhaps demonstrative of the underlying prob-
lem: patent misuse is an ill-adapted tool for addressing sup-
pressive joint ventures. 
2.  Lenient Standing Will Undermine the Legitimacy of Claims 
A lax standing requirement is one of patent misuse’s most 
striking features: a defendant need not show an injury result-
ing from the alleged wrongdoing.144 From a standpoint of op-
timal deterrence, one considers the factors that would best dis-
courage the undesired suppressive behavior. In this respect, 
patent misuse could theoretically be useful—in providing more 
access to a greater number of parties by lowering the threshold 
for consideration, the likelihood of addressing misconduct in-
creases.145 
Problems arise, however, because misuse may be prone to 
overdeterrence. The standing requirements to bring a suit are 
so lax that the fear of litigation or of being improperly sanc-
tioned discourages legitimate patent uses.146 Imagine searching 
for a certain person in a phonebook. Because phonebooks list 
names alphabetically, one might search only the pages that 
start with the same letter as of the person’s last name. The re-
striction of one’s search to only probable candidates is analog-
ous to implementing a standing requirement. Conversely, if one 
is not selective at all in determining how to search, there will 
be a great deal of predictably incorrect listings through which 
to pore. Additionally, the more pages one scans, the more likely 
one is to make a mistake. In the context of patent misuse, the 
lower threshold for standing may likewise increase the errone-
ous punishing of procompetitive acts. 
Moreover, there is also no guarantee that applying patent 
misuse for joint ventures in technology suppression—and 
therefore, a lower standing requirement—would correlate with 
increased deterrence of the sort of harm that really matters. 
Misuse, for all its potential for increased access, sometimes al-
 
 144. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 145. Cf. Cotter, supra note 29, at 5–9 (presenting the merits of, though ul-
timately rejecting, this argument). 
 146. See id. (―By doing away with any standing requirement and rendering 
misused patents unenforceable in their entirety, misuse doctrine risks overde-
terring procompetitive or neutral conduct that might be difficult to distinguish 
from anticompetitive conduct.‖). 
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lows access for the wrong reasons.147 For example, in Princo 
Corp. v. International Trade Commission, Princo sought to 
manufacture discs compliant with the Orange Book standard—
meaning they were interested in using the promoted patent, 
not the suppressed patent.148 Subsequently, Princo stopped 
paying the licensing fees for the patent pool.149 The crucial 
question is if the law should provide a weapon to licensees who 
are simply upset with their fee arrangements. Princo raised the 
misuse defense, notwithstanding a lack of evidence that Princo 
intended to develop or use the suppressed patent.150 Apparent-
ly, Princo was simply citing suppression as support for its claim 
that Philips’s behavior was anticompetitive.151 Thus, while 
Princo may have objected to the suppression of the patent’s de-
velopment, it objected in name only—as it had no true interest 
in using the technology.  
C.  REMEDY REFORM: BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF THE 
PATENTEE AND THE PUBLIC 
To deter joint ventures that suppress a technology, courts 
could look to limit the power that holders of suppressed patents 
possess. If courts were to deny injunctive relief for nonpractic-
ing patentees, and instead award damages only—in the form of 
a compulsory license (alternatively known as reasonable or on-
going royalties)—it would likely represent a compromise be-
tween the interests of the patent owner and the public. It 
would, however, provide an analytical challenge attempting to 
discern the various incentives and equitable considerations in-
volved in the application of such a scheme. Finally, it is unclear 
whether denying equitable relief would be fundamentally in-
compatible with the tenets of the patent system. 
1.  Awarding Only Reasonable Royalties Is a Reasonable 
Compromise 
One of the most compelling reasons for courts to assign 
compulsory licenses in cases of technology suppression is that it 
 
 147. At least, it allows access for reasons redundant in light of antitrust. 
 148. 616 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 
2480 (2011); see also supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 149. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1323. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 15–16, Princo, 616 F.3d 1318 (No. 
2007-1386) (arguing that the Lagadec patent was removed from price and 
technological competition under a heading asserting ―anticompetitive effect‖). 
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would make the patent available for public consumption and 
development while still compensating the patentee.152 Yet, this 
compromise does not represent a perfect middle ground, be-
cause it may harm the patentee.153 It is most likely that the pa-
tentee will be worse off, since encroaching on her absolute right 
to exclude others (and, historically, receive an injunction)154 es-
sentially reduces the value of the patent.155 This, however, may 
be an unsympathetic argument when considered in the context 
of nonpracticing patentees.156 Alternatively, one may perceive 
the diminution in value as its redistribution to the public.157 
Since others can develop or use the invention, the public is able 
to reap any social good able to be derived from the patent.158 
Thus, when the public is also considered, compulsory licenses 
might represent a reasonable compromise among the patentee, 
licensee, and the social good.  
2.  Developing a Workable Formula is Complicated 
The complex relationship between parties in a joint ven-
ture gives rise to a difficult set of calculations for a remedial 
compulsory licensing scheme. Moreover, the incentives created 
by such a scheme become somewhat more unpredictable com-
pared to unilateral suppression. First, the contractual relation-
ship between the two parties in the joint ventures makes un-
derstanding the forced licensing more complicated. For 
example, under this scheme, if a third party infringes a sup-
pressed patent in a pool,159 a court would likely form an after-
 
 152. See supra notes 17–1819 and accompanying text. 
 153. Cf. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 55.15 (Joseph M. Pe-
rillo, ed. 2009) (noting that in the efficient breach theory of contracts, the ideal 
situation is where at least one party is made better off, and none worse off). 
 154. See Venkatesan, supra note 91, at 33 (noting the general rule in the 
Federal Circuit had been to nearly automatically grant injunctions). 
 155. See id. at 34 (―Without the right to obtain an injunction, the patentees’ 
right to exclude would be reduced to a fraction of its value, reducing the incen-
tives for scientific and technological research.‖). See generally Einer Elhauge, 
Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive 
Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535 (2008) (discussing the tendencies 
to underestimate the proper royalties for a patentee). 
 156. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. 
 157. See Saunders, supra note 14, at 398 (―This . . . optimizes social wel-
fare . . . through the patentee’s use or license to others.‖). 
 158. See id. 
 159. Patent pools are discussed supra, notes 30–33 and in accompanying 
text. 
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the-fact licensing agreement between the suppressed patent 
owner and the infringer.160 
Though copyright law also essentially does this in its com-
pulsory licensing schemes, the context is quite different from 
any that would render a similar approach workable in patent 
law.161 One of the more straightforward provisions makes an 
option available to copyright owners of musical works,162 where 
they can be paid a statutorily set royalty by those wishing to 
make or distribute the work.163 Patents, on the other hand, are 
so varied in form and purpose that any attempt to create a uni-
form set of royalties would be futile. An appropriate amount for 
a patent license would be unable to be determined in advance. 
The possibility that a court could constructively create 
nonexclusive licenses would make suppression agreements 
much less attractive, since presumably nearly all of the agree-
ment’s value to the pool is in the elimination of competition.164 
Additionally, it is the possibility of obtaining an injunction that 
can make a nonworked patent so valuable.165 While the actual 
contribution from a patent might be financially miniscule, the 
prospect of shutting down a product or business gives a non-
worked patentee significant leverage.166 
It is therefore necessary to consider exactly how troubling 
joint ventures are, since taking away their primary value will 
significantly curtail their formation. On the other hand, per-
haps the consequences of forced licenses will be minimal be-
cause infringing firms face such a significant battle to compete. 
Even given free rein to practice and develop a newly licensed 
 
 160. Indeed, the hypothetical negotiation is assumed to be between the in-
fringer and the patent owner. CHISUM, supra note 45, § 20.03[3][a] n.4.  
 161. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006); see also id. §§ 111(c), 114(d)(2), 118 (mak-
ing licensing agreements available for other copyrightable media). 
 162. Id. § 115(c)(1). 
 163. Id. § 115.  
 164. In Princo, Sony received thirty-six percent of the revenue from licens-
ing the Orange Book CD-RW pool. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 
F.3d 1318, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting). cert. de-
nied, 131 S.Ct. 2480 (2011). This was the case even though the Lagadec patent 
provided no value to licensees, since they were forbidden to use it outside of 
making Orange Book compliant discs (which did not use the Sony technology). 
Id. 
 165. See Rob Kelley, BlackBerry Maker, NTP Ink $612 Million Settlement, 
CNN MONEY (Mar. 3, 2006), http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/technology/rimm_ 
ntp/ (explaining how BlackBerry maker RIM and NTP, a patent holding com-
pany, reached an enormous settlement, because NTP could shut down RIM’s 
use of a wireless email service, presumably through an injunction). 
 166. See id. 
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patent, firms may decline to do so because the technology has 
already been put at a disadvantage by the industry’s accep-
tance of the promoted standard.167 In that case, it is unclear 
whether the remedial scheme would provide an adequate in-
centive for firms to attempt to unseat a joint venture sitting on 
an unutilized technology. Overall, establishing any sort of com-
pulsory licensing scheme would be difficult because of the com-
plications involved in creating a formula that properly balances 
all of the appropriate considerations. 
3.  Forced Licensing Is Not Fundamentally Inconsistent with 
Patent Law 
The right to exclude is one of the fundamental rights of the 
patent system.168 Indeed, the Patent Act squarely addresses 
this power.169 At first blush, a forced licensing regime seems to 
be at odds with this. It is questionable, however, whether these 
remedial schemes would truly frustrate the patent system, or 
simply be contrary to tradition. 
The United States is a party to the international Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
which explicitly allows for compulsory licensing arrange-
ments.170 Countries have in fact considered and implemented 
these schemes,171 presumably without causing devastating eco-
nomic collapse. As with other doctrines in patent law,172 a prac-
tice that seems bizarre and fundamentally incompatible might 
simply seem that way because of the history of the American 
patent system. 
 
 167. See Van Etten, supra note 30, at 245 (observing that package licenses 
can discourage other firms from investing in displacing the existing standard). 
 168. See, e.g., Venkatesan, supra note 91, at 33 (―Patent rights were not 
created to give patentees the right to use the patented technologies, a right 
they already had. A patent provides the right to exclude others, unconditional-
ly.‖ (emphasis in original)).  
 169. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). 
 170. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
art. 31, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS]. The TRIPS agreement 
is not self-executing, however, and cannot be asserted in any claim or defense 
except by the United States. In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1210 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (citing 19 U.S.C § 3512(c)(1) (2000)).  
 171. Blair & Cotter, supra note 74, at 84. 
 172. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent 
Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1303 (2003) (noting 
the distinctive first-to-invent priority system that was used in U.S. patent law 
as opposed to the rest of the world, which follows a first-to-file system). 
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III.  REMEDY RECONSTRUCTION: AN ACCEPTABLE 
BALANCE   
Finding a middle ground between the patentee and the 
public is the most attractive solution. The public enjoys the 
benefits of patents in use, while the patentee is justly compen-
sated for her inventive investment. This would mean a court 
should refuse an injunction and award only damages wherever 
a joint venture’s patent is going unused and unlicensed. Be-
cause an agreement to share profits provides information on 
the value of the suppressed patent, a court can better deter-
mine a fair license. This is so despite the inherent limitations of 
a court’s analysis. 
A.  JOINT VENTURES PROVIDE COURTS WITH BETTER 
INFORMATION 
Courts examining joint ventures have a distinct advantage 
over those looking into unilateral attempts to suppress technol-
ogy, namely, there is often a negotiation that provides some in-
sight into the firms’ assessment of the suppressed patent’s val-
ue. For example, in the Princo case that alleged anticompetitive 
collusion between Philips and Sony, Sony received thirty-six 
percent of the license fees from the package license, although it 
only contributed one patent: a patent that was useless because 
of the conditions of the license agreement.173 This sort of dis-
proportionate arrangement could serve as an important indica-
tor regarding the social harm—the anticompetitive harm—
generated by a patent’s suppression. Princo, in fact, raised this 
argument in their reply brief.174 The en banc majority in Princo 
did not comment on this fact, although the dissent expressed 
surprise at the disproportionate rewards flowing to Sony.175 
One can infer that the disparity between actual patent con-
tribution and the share of compensation is likely related to how 
well the parties believe the patent will compete. In other words, 
the more consideration flowing to the suppressed patent holder, 
the higher the likelihood the joint venture is suppressing a po-
tentially viable product. Imagine two parties, in an artificially 
simplified world,176 with two alternative technologies each in 
 
 173. See supra note 164. 
 174. Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 151 at 17–18. 
 175. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1344–45 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting). cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2480 (2011). 
 176. Some factors that are ignored here and should be considered are dis-
cussed infra. 
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early development, A and A*. If they want to invest in, develop, 
and license only one technology, and they can identify their re-
spective chances of success beforehand, then the firms will like-
ly bargain to an even split of the licensing revenue, with, say, A 
promoted and A* suppressed. This is so because neither firm 
would be willing to take less than fifty percent of licensing rev-
enue, the expected value of the patents, before a winner is cho-
sen. This is similar to betting on a coin flip with one dollar at 
stake. The rational bargain is fifty cents to each party, since 
neither party can determine the outcome ex ante. The problem 
with this sort of agreement is that it can be the wrong choice 
for the public good. 
If A* turns out to have more social value, one could say A* 
was wrongly suppressed. The public is injured by the firms’ 
choice to promote A and suppress A*. Though the firms made 
the choice assuming the two technologies were of equal value, 
the firms guessed wrong. If, instead, A and A* were allowed to 
freely compete, A*’s superiority would eventually be discovered, 
and the public would ultimately benefit. 
To continue the coin analogy, this Part proposes inferring 
something about the odds of the flip from the ex ante agreement 
to split the prize. To that effect, this Note proposes that the 
courts align the compulsory license price with the social harm 
generated: the more disproportionate the agreement, the less 
compensation a nonpracticing patentee should receive from an 
infringer. Courts should implement this as a consideration in 
calculating reasonable royalties, giving the judge a tool that is 
more responsive to the unique facts of each case. Since holders 
of potentially valuable suppressed patents in joint ventures 
would receive reduced damages from infringement, this solu-
tion would help encourage technological development in lieu of 
agreements to suppress. 
This determination would happen in the context of a pa-
tent infringement suit, at the damages stage. First, a court 
would make the threshold inquiry that there was a joint ven-
ture that suppressed the patent in question. Next, the court 
would look at all the evidence, including any agreements be-
tween the parties. Finally, the court would take all this into 
consideration while crafting an appropriate royalty arrange-
ment.177 If the patent holder agreed to suppress A* for ten per-
cent of A’s profits, a court would minimally discount any com-
 
 177. For a discussion of other considerations in determining reasonable 
royalties, see supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
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pulsory license, since the firms’ agreement suggests A* has li-
mited ability to compete on its own. If, however, a patent holder 
agreed to suppress A* for ninety percent of the A’s profits, a 
court would severely discount any royalty paid to A*, because 
the agreement indicates that A* would compete extremely well 
against A. 
The degree that this argument is persuasive depends on 
whether the assumptions made were somewhat realistic: the 
next section examines whether the inference claimed above is 
at all practical in real world applications. 
B. COURTS CAN LOOK TO AGREEMENTS DESPITE OTHER 
REASONS FOR BARGAINING 
Parties entering into a joint venture to promote one patent 
and suppress another always lack information about the actual 
marketability and future value of their respective patents. The 
principle of capturing some of the future is one of the rationales 
for several patent law doctrines.178 Moreover, it is not likely 
that the two technologies will be perfectly substitutable. Still, 
there are similar difficulties in determining reasonable royal-
ties in the analysis courts use today, so this limitation puts 
parties at least no worse off than under current approaches.179 
Next, owners of a suppressed patent may have legitimate 
reasons to accept a different price relative to its projected val-
ue. For example, a party might have no reasonable mechanism 
in place for licensing a certain technology. In that case, the dis-
advantaged party would likely be willing to accept a diminished 
share of the shared licensing revenue. Alternatively, one party 
may have a significant interest in keeping the other’s patent 
from being licensed or used, likely because of some threat to a 
related good. Here, that party would be willing to pay a pre-
mium under a joint agreement to suppress. 
Interestingly, these imperfections may in fact help deter-
mine a more ideal royalty. If it is beneficial to deter most 
strongly the agreements that harm the public the most, and de-
ter least those that cause little harm, perhaps an analysis of 
the agreement can still provide useful indicators. For example, 
if a firm is truly unprepared to license or use a patent on its 
 
 178. See CHISUM, supra note 45, § 16.02[1][a] (explaining blocking patents 
and the doctrine of equivalents). 
 179. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 74, at 37–40 (discussing the current 
system of reasonable royalties, including the Georgia-Pacific Corp. factors dis-
cussed supra Part I.C.1). 
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own, society suffers less harm, since the product may not have 
made it into the market anyway. Since the firms would devalue 
this patent, taking the shares of revenue into account would ac-
curately find this sort of behavior less anticompetitive than it 
otherwise would be. Likewise, a company fearing competition 
on other fronts besides its substitutable patent will pay a pre-
mium, and this will result in an overestimation of the value of 
the patent. This also makes sense: the firm paying the pre-
mium is denying the public access to a patent that it has un-
derstood to be valuable. Hence, it should invite greater deter-
rence. 
  CONCLUSION   
Preventing joint ventures where one technology is pro-
moted at the expense of another is a complicated and nuanced 
problem. Primarily, these joint ventures harm society by with-
holding new and potentially useful inventions from the public. 
In preventing others from improving on a technology, these 
suppression joint ventures foreclose the unknown and stifle in-
novation. Following the contours of current legal regimes, re-
thinking remedies provides the best approach: a compromise 
between the public and the patentee. Courts should be able to 
use the additional evidence available in these ventures to bet-
ter deter the formation of these suppressive joint ventures. 
Moreover, awarding only damages—instead of injunctions—
balances the interests of the public in having use of a new in-
vention, while still respecting the legitimate rights of the un-
used-patent holder. Ultimately, while not perfect, remedy 
reform provides the best opportunity for courts to deter joint 
ventures in technology suppression while not deviating too far 
from existing legal doctrine. 
